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UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTIONS: EXAMINING TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER 
NONMEMBERS NEARLY TWO DECADES AFTER DURO V. REINA  
BENJAMIN J. CORDIANO 
In a series of decisions beginning in 1978 with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, the Supreme Court has stripped Indian tribes of the ability to prosecute all 
criminal offenders within the borders of their territory.  A decade after holding 
that non-Indians were not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes, the 
Supreme Court, in Duro v. Reina, held that Indian tribes do not possess criminal 
jurisdiction over Indians that were not members of the tribe.  The decision created 
a jurisdictional void: for certain types of crimes neither the federal, state, nor 
tribal governments possessed the power to prosecute nonmember Indian offenders.   
Congress acted quickly to rectify the jurisdictional gap caused by the Court’s 
decision in Duro, passing legislation which became known as the “Duro Fix.”  
The “Duro Fix” has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the double jeopardy 
context, but the Court has not yet heard a case involving an equal protection or 
due process challenge to the legislation.  If such a challenge materializes, the law 
could see a return to the reasoning used by the Duro Court.   
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Duro and uses nearly 
twenty years of anecdotal evidence, case law, and congressional findings to show 
that the Court relied on flawed assumptions about the nature of nonmember 
criminal jurisdiction in the modern tribal context.  By examining the modern 
realities of two tribes, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, this Note concludes that 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Duro is flawed and that criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians is crucial to tribal self-governance and maintenance of 
reservation life. 
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 UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTIONS: EXAMINING TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER 
NONMEMBERS NEARLY TWO DECADES AFTER DURO V. REINA 
BENJAMIN J. CORDIANO ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The newly formed United States government began entering into 
treaties with the Indian nations in 1778.1  The treaties constituted 
international agreements between two nations and illustrate that initially 
the United States treated the Indian nations as full sovereigns.2  Fifty years 
later, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court declared that 
Indian tribes were not foreign nations under the Constitution, but instead 
domestic dependent nations.3  In 1871, Congress enacted a statute 
declaring that Indian tribes would no longer be recognized as “independent 
nations” with whom the United States may contract by treaty.4  The 
sovereignty of Indian tribes is not made clear in the United States 
Constitution, which refers to Indian tribes only for the purpose of declaring 
that Congress has the power to regulate commerce with them.5  Thus, the 
status of Indian tribes within our political system has been defined over the 
years by a mixture of Supreme Court jurisprudence and Congressional 
action.   
One aspect of sovereignty that Indian tribes have not retained is the 
ability to prosecute all criminal offenders within the borders of their 
territory.6  In 1978, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme 
Court held that non-Indians were not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of 
Indian tribes.7  The Court stated that although Indian tribes retain certain 
“quasi-sovereign” authority, they are prohibited from exercising powers 
that are “inconsistent with their status.”8 
In Duro v. Reina, decided a decade later, the Supreme Court continued 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Boston College, B.S. 2004; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009.  I 
would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Bethany Berger for her guidance, suggestions and 
encouragement throughout the writing process.  I also wish to thank Mr. John Petoskey, Chief Judge 
Wilson Brott, and Chief Justice Anita Dupris, whose willingness to help made this Note possible.  
Finally, I thank my colleagues on the law review for all of their hard work and dedication.   
1 Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.  
2 See id. (describing the agreement as between the “United States of North-America” and the 
“Delaware Nation”).  
3 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (stating Indian nations may be more 
correctly denominated “domestic dependent nations”). 
4 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000). 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
6 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).  
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 208.  
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to whittle away at tribal sovereignty, holding that Indian tribes did not 
possess criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not members of the 
tribe.9  Although the decision ostensibly rested on Oliphant, it in fact 
turned on concerns more applicable to an equal protection or due process 
analysis, such as the characteristics of tribal justice systems and the place 
of nonmember Indians within them.10  The decision created a jurisdictional 
void for certain types of crimes; neither the federal government, state 
government, nor the tribes possessed the power to prosecute nonmember 
Indian offenders for certain types of offenses.11  Congress acted quickly to 
rectify the jurisdictional gap left by the Court’s decision in Duro.  Six 
months after the decision, Congress enacted Public Law 101-511, 
amending the definition of tribal “powers of self government” in the Indian 
Civil Rights Act to include, “the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”12  This became known as the “Duro Fix.”13 
In 2004, the Supreme Court heard the first case challenging the “Duro 
Fix.”14  In United States v. Lara, the Court, in the context of a double 
jeopardy challenge, upheld the Congressional power to recognize and 
affirm tribal sovereignty in the context of criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians.15  Notably, the Court did not resolve whether the Due 
Process or Equal Protection Clauses prohibit tribes from prosecuting a 
nonmember citizen of the United States.16  If the Supreme Court hears a 
case challenging the Duro Fix under either equal protection or due process 
grounds, the law could see a return to the reasoning used by the Court in 
Duro v. Reina.  This Note examines the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Duro and argues that the Court relied on flawed assumptions about the 
nature of nonmember criminal jurisdiction in the modern tribal context. 
Part II of this Note sets forth the scope of criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country and examines the judicial limitations placed on tribal 
criminal jurisdiction in Oliphant and Duro.17  It will also discuss the Duro 
Fix and the subsequent challenge in United States v. Lara, and outline the 
equal protection analysis applied to measures affecting Indian people.  Part 
                                                                                                                          
9 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990).   
10 See id. at 693–96 (discussing the “special nature” of tribal courts). 
11 See id. at 697–98 (stating that its decision did not imply endorsement of the theory of a 
jurisdictional void and that “if the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical 
needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem is Congress, which 
has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs”). 
12 Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)–(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93 (1990) (codified as amended 25 
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)).  
13 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).  This Note will refer to Public Law 101-511, 
amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301, as the “Duro Fix.”   
14 Id.   
15 Id. at 199–206.  
16 Id. at 205.  
17 See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (defining “Indian Country”).  
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III analyzes closely the Duro Court’s assumptions regarding tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, using a number of sources to show 
that these assumptions are incorrect given modern realities in Indian 
country.  Part IV focuses this empirical lens, closely examining the 
realities of nonmember criminal jurisdiction in Indian country in the 
context of two tribes: the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation.  This 
Note concludes that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Duro does not 
adequately reflect the characteristics of modern Indian tribes and that 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is crucial to tribal self-
governance and maintenance of reservation life.   
II.  JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 
A.  Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “criminal jurisdiction over offenses 
committed in Indian country is governed by a complex patchwork of 
federal, state, and tribal law.”18  Whether a crime committed in Indian 
country may be prosecuted by the United States, the state, or a tribe, 
depends on a variety of factors.19   
The Indian Country Crimes Act (“ICCA”) provides that the general 
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in 
any place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States extend to 
Indian country.20  The ICCA contains two important exceptions: the 
jurisdiction of the federal government does not extend to offenses 
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, 
nor does it extend to any Indian committing any offense in Indian country 
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe.21  Therefore, although 
the federal government has broad jurisdiction in Indian country, it 
generally has no jurisdiction for crimes between Indians and may not 
prosecute Indian offenders who have already been punished by the tribe.   
The Indian Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) enumerates fourteen offenses 
that, if committed by an Indian in Indian country, are subject to the same 
laws and penalties that apply in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.22  
                                                                                                                          
18 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993) (citations omitted).  
19 As will be illustrated, these may include the identities of the victim and the defendant, the 
nature of the crime, and the existence of specific statutory provisions governing jurisdiction.   
20 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).   
21 Id.  
22 Id. § 1153 (2000) (identifying offenses covered under the statute including, among others, 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and assault with a dangerous weapon).  The statute was passed in 
reaction to Ex Parte Crow Dog, in which the Supreme Court held that the federal government had no 
jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of another Indian.  Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 
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Importantly, the statute, unlike the ICCA, does not contain an exception for 
crimes committed between two Indians.23  It remains an open question 
whether federal jurisdiction is exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.24  Further, 
the Assimilative Crimes Act compensates for the less exhaustive federal 
criminal code by applying the appropriate state criminal law to cases in 
which the federal government has jurisdiction, but federal statutes have not 
defined the crime.25 
Generally, state authority to prosecute crimes involving Indians in 
Indian country is pre-empted as a matter of federal law.26  States, however, 
do possess exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians 
against non-Indians in Indian country.27  Congress has plenary authority to 
alter these “jurisdictional guideposts,” and has done so with respect to 
certain states.28  In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280, which granted 
a number of states authority to exercise general criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians in Indian country and made the ICCA and MCA inapplicable in 
those areas.29  However, the vast majority of Indians have never been 
subject to Public Law 280.  Since it was passed, the statute has been 
unpopular with both states and tribes and the inadequacies of Public Law 
280 have led to endemic lawlessness in many parts of Indian country.30   
The Supreme Court has held that “tribes possess those aspects of 
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a 
necessary result of their dependent status.”31  Therefore, tribes have the 
power, by virtue of their retained inherent sovereignty, to prosecute their 
own members for violations of tribal law.32  The Court has held, however, 
that tribes have been divested of their inherent power to prosecute non-
                                                                                                                          
(1883); see Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209–12 (1973) (describing the Court’s holding in Ex 
Parte Crow Dog and the Congressional response).   
23 18 U.S.C. § 1153.  
24 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990); see Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 
1995) (finding that tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within the MCA but dismissing the habeas 
corpus petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to exhaust her tribal court remedies).  
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) (stating that any person guilty of an act which, although not made 
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed within the jurisdiction of 
the State, shall be guilty of like offense and like punishment). 
26 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993).   
27 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).   
28 Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 103.   
29 67 Stat. 588, 588–60 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) (mandatory states) & 25 
U.S.C. § 1321 (2000) (optional states)).   
30 Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California 
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1409 (1997) (examining Public Law 280 as the source of 
lawlessness rather than its remedy); see Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: 
Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical State of American Indian Law, 38 TULSA L. REV. 
113, 129 (2002) (discussing inadequacies of Public Law 280 that have led to “endemic lawlessness” in 
many parts of Indian country).  
31 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).  
32 Id. at 326 (“[T]he sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly 
does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their 
dependent status.”). 
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Indians by virtue of their dependent status.33   
Indian tribes, because their sovereignty predated the formation of the 
Union, are not bound by the United States Constitution.34  Although the 
Bill of Rights therefore does not apply to tribal governments, the Indian 
Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) imposes similar restrictions on tribes.35  The 
ICRA contains, among others, an equal protection and due process 
provision, a prohibition from compelling any person in a criminal case 
from being a witness against himself, a double jeopardy clause, and a 
takings clause.36  Although the ICRA mirrors the Bill of Rights in many 
important ways, key differences remain that are relevant in the criminal 
context.  The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, applicable to the 
federal government and later incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, requires that indigent defendants in criminal cases 
have access to effective assistance of counsel at the expense of the state.37  
The ICRA, although securing the right to assistance of counsel in criminal 
proceedings, does so only at the defendant’s own expense.38  In addition, 
the Sixth Amendment requires that defendants in criminal proceedings be 
afforded an impartial jury comprised of one’s peers.39  The ICRA requires 
that tribal courts provide a jury at the defendant’s request where 
imprisonment is a potential punishment; however, there is no provision 
concerning the jury’s impartiality or its makeup, beyond a numerical 
requirement.40  The Fifth Amendment demands that no person be held to 
answer for an infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury.41  The ICRA contains no references to indictment by grand 
jury;42 nevertheless, it should be noted that the United States Supreme 
Court has not found that particular provision to be incorporated against the 
                                                                                                                          
33 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1978).  
34 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing 
the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional 
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 
376, 383–84 (1896) (holding that the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to tribal actions).  
35 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . 
compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due 
process of law.”).    
36 Id.  
37 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (discussing 
applicability of the right to counsel against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause).   
38 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6).   
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the 
right to be tried by a jury of one’s peers as an “inestimable safeguard,” and holding it applicable against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).  
40 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny 
to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by 
jury of not less than six persons.”).  
41 U.S. CONST. amend V.  
42 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).  
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.43  The 
only remedy available in federal court to enforce the ICRA is a writ of 
habeas corpus, which effectively limits federal review under the Act to 
criminal cases and other matters involving deprivations of personal 
freedom.44 
To summarize generally, tribal courts have jurisdiction only over 
offenses involving an Indian offender.  Further, tribes are limited by the 
ICRA to imposing punishments of up to one year in prison and a fine of 
$5000.45  For offenses enumerated in the MCA, the federal government has 
jurisdiction even if the crime is between two Indians, and otherwise has 
jurisdiction only if the crime is between an Indian and a non-Indian.  Tribal 
courts have no jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders, and, outside Public 
Law 280 states, the state has jurisdiction only where the crime involves 
two non-Indians. 
B.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 
In Oliphant, the Suquamish tribe sought to prosecute two non-Indian 
residents of the Port Madison Reservation: Mark Oliphant, for assaulting a 
tribal officer and resisting arrest, and Daniel Belgarde, arrested by tribal 
authorities for reckless driving after he led tribal police officers on a high-
speed race along the Reservation highways that ended only when Belgarde 
collided with a tribal police vehicle.46  Both defendants applied for a writ 
of habeas corpus to the United States District Court, which was denied and 
later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.47  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether tribal 
courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.48 
The Court first determined that tribes historically had not assumed 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by treaty or custom, although the 
evidence was equivocal.49  Next, the Court examined federal enactments to 
determine whether Congress had recognized criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians.  The Court relied on an “unspoken assumption” by Congress 
that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and expanded a 
nineteenth century decision in which the court reached an “implicit 
conclusion” that although Congress never expressly forbade such 
                                                                                                                          
43 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884).   
44 13 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000); see Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 
35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 899 n.64 and accompanying text (2003) (citing non-criminal cases in which the 
habeas provision has been invoked).   
45 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). 
46 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).   
47 Id. at 194–95.  
48 Id. at 195.  
49 Id. at 197–200, 208.  
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jurisdiction, it was a necessary result of repeated legislation.50  Finally, the 
Court determined that the inherent sovereignty of tribes is limited not only 
by treaty restrictions and congressional divestiture, but also when the 
inherent sovereignty of tribes is inconsistent with their status.51  Upon 
incorporation into the territory of the United States, the exercise by tribes 
of separate powers was constrained where it conflicted with that of the 
overriding sovereign.52  Tribes necessarily surrendered their power to try 
non-Indians because of the overriding sovereign’s “great solicitude that its 
citizens be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal 
liberty.”53   
As Professor Bethany Berger has noted, the Oliphant Court’s decision 
“created something wholly new in Indian Law, the principle that simply by 
incorporation within the United States tribes had lost inherent criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.”54  Although the Court’s decision has been 
vigorously criticized by scholars,55 it remains law that tribal courts have no 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.56 
C.  Duro v. Reina 
The United States Supreme Court continued the divestiture of tribal 
sovereignty begun in Oliphant with its decision in Duro v. Reina, holding 
that the retained sovereignty of a tribe does not include the right to try 
nonmember Indians.57  Albert Duro, an enrolled member of a band of 
Cahuilla Mission Indians, is a native of California who, before 1984, lived 
most of his life outside an Indian reservation.58  In 1984, he resided on the 
Salt River Reservation with a female tribal member and worked for a tribal 
                                                                                                                          
50 Id. at 203–04 (citing In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115–16 (1891)).  
51 Id. at 208.  
52 Id. at 209.  
53 Id. at 210.  
54 Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal 
Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1056 (2005).  
55 See Russell Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 610 (1979) (“A close 
examination of the Court’s opinion reveals a carelessness with history, logic, precedent, and statutory 
construction that is not ordinarily acceptable from so august a tribunal.”); Berger, supra note 54, at 
1056 (“By patching together bits and pieces of history and isolated quotes from nineteenth century 
cases, and relegating contrary evidence to footnotes or ignoring it altogether, the majority created a 
legal basis for denying jurisdiction out of whole cloth.”); Catherine B. Stetson, Decriminalizing Tribal 
Codes: A Response to Oliphant, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 54 (1981) (stating that Rehnquist’s “misuse 
of precedent and other authority, his failure to apply traditional canons of construction, his false 
assumptions and poor arguments have served as fertile ground for criticism”).  
56 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 682 (1990) (“Under this Court’s holding in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”) (citation 
omitted).   
57 Id. at 679.  
58 Id. 
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construction company.59  As an enrolled member of another Indian tribe, 
Duro was not eligible for enrollment in the Salt River Pima-Maricopa 
Indian Community, the reservation’s governing tribe.60  On June 15, 1984, 
Duro allegedly shot and killed a fourteen-year-old boy within the 
boundaries of the reservation.  The victim was a member of the Gila River 
Indian Tribe of Arizona, a separate tribe occupying a separate 
reservation.61  A complaint was filed in United States District Court, 
charging Duro with murder and aiding and abetting murder under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2, 1111, 1153.62  Duro was arrested by federal agents in 
California, but the indictment was later dismissed on the motion of the 
United States Attorney.63  The tribe then took custody of Duro and charged 
him with illegal firing of a weapon on the reservation, a misdemeanor 
crime punishable at that time by up to six months imprisonment and a $500 
fine.64  After the tribal court denied his motion to dismiss the prosecution 
for lack of jurisdiction, Duro filed a petition for habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court.65   
The district court granted the writ, holding that any assertion of 
criminal jurisdiction by the tribe over a nonmember Indian would violate 
the equal protection guarantees of the ICRA; since the tribe could not 
prosecute non-Indians under Oliphant, to subject a nonmember Indian to 
tribal jurisdiction would constitute discrimination based on race.66  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district 
court’s order, in an opinion that was later revised.67  The Ninth Circuit 
found that the district court erroneously assumed that tribal courts extend 
their criminal jurisdiction to Indians on the basis of race.68  Rather, the 
court concluded that, “for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, Indian status 
is ‘based on a totality of circumstances, including genealogy, group 
identification, and lifestyle, in which no one factor is dispositive.’”69  
Using this definition, the court then determined that Duro’s contacts with 
the tribe, such as residing with a member on the reservation and his 
                                                                                                                          
59 Id.  The Salt River Reservation, which occupies approximately 50,000 acres east of Scottsdale, 
Arizona, was authorized by statute in 1859 and established by Executive Order in 1879.  Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 679–80.  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000), commonly known as the Major Crimes Act, subjects 
Indians to federal jurisdiction for certain enumerated offenses.  See Id. § 2 (“Whoever commits an 
offense against the United States or aids, [or] abets . . . its commission, is punishable as a principal.”); 
Id. § 1111 (defining murder); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the Major 
Crimes Act).  
63 Duro, 495 U.S. at 679–80.  
64 Id. at 681 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982)).  
65 Id. at 681–82.  
66 Id. at 682.  
67 Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987), modified, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988). 
68 Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d at 1144.  
69 Id. (quoting Robert Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 518 (1976)).  
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employment with the tribe, justified tribal jurisdiction.70  The court 
concluded that the need for effective law enforcement on the reservation 
provided a rational basis for the classification.71  The court found that its 
conclusion was strengthened by the fact that a contrary holding would 
create a jurisdictional void in which neither the federal government, states, 
nor tribes could try nonmember Indians for misdemeanor crimes.72 
Between the first and second sets of opinions from the Ninth Circuit, 
the Eighth Circuit, in Greywater v. Johnson, held that tribal courts do not 
possess inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.73  The 
Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning,74 and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in circuits.75 
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach and stated that the 
rationale of its decisions in Oliphant and United States v. Wheeler, a case 
decided sixteen days after Oliphant, compelled the conclusion that Indian 
tribes lack jurisdiction over persons who are not tribe members.76  The 
tribes and the United States sought to distinguish Oliphant by showing that 
tribes historically asserted criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers and that 
all previous congressional legislation applied to all Indians without respect 
to membership in a particular tribe.  The Court rejected this argument.77  
Similarly, although Wheeler involved a tribal member’s double jeopardy 
challenge, the Duro Court nonetheless found its analysis of inherent tribal 
sovereignty persuasive.78  According to the Duro Court, following 
Wheeler, the retained sovereignty of the tribes is only that needed to 
control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique 
                                                                                                                          
70 Duro, 851 F.2d at 1144.  
71 Id. at 1145.  
72 Id. at 1145–46.  
73 Greywater v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 1988).  In Greywater, three members of the 
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians were arrested on the Devils Lake Indian Reservation in 
North Dakota and charged with possession of alcohol in a motor vehicle, public intoxication, and 
disorderly conduct.  Id. at 487.  The defendants moved the Sioux Tribal Court to dismiss the charges 
against them, maintaining that the tribal court had no criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers of the 
Devils Lake Sioux Tribe.  Id.  After the tribal court denied the motions, the defendants filed writs of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court, which were denied pending exhaustion of the tribal 
court proceedings.  Id. at 487–88.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and directed 
that the writs be issued, holding that the tribe did not possess criminal jurisdiction over the defendants.  
Id. at 493.  Although the court acknowledged that Oliphant concerned only non-Indians, it interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s analysis to compel the same conclusion as to nonmembers of the tribe, whether 
Indian or not.  Id. at 491.  
74 Duro, 851 F.2d at 1140 n.1.  
75 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684 (1990).  
76 Id. at 684–85. 
77 Id. at 689.  Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that in fact the evidence is stronger and tends 
to support such jurisdiction.  See id. at 703–04 n.2 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he historical record reveals that Congress and the Executive had indeed considered the question of 
intertribal crime.”).   
78 Id. at 685.  
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customs and social order.79 
The Supreme Court did not explicitly address the equal protection 
question; nevertheless, much of the majority opinion concerned whether 
nonmember Indians were similarly situated to non-Indians on reservations, 
and the due process concerns raised by tribal courts.80  The Court found 
that for purposes of criminal jurisdiction, a nonmember’s relationship with 
a tribe is the same as a non-Indian’s: Duro could not vote, hold office, or 
serve on a jury under Pima-Maricopa authority.  Therefore, exercising 
jurisdiction over him would not fall within the powers necessary for tribal 
self-governance.81  
The Duro Court also focused on the “special nature” of tribal courts.82  
Tribal courts, it stated, are influenced by the unique customs, languages, 
and usages of the tribes they serve and their legal methods may depend on 
“unspoken practices and norms.”83  Significant to the Court was the fact 
that the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal governments.84  Although the 
Court recognized that the ICRA provides guarantees of fair procedure, it 
found that these were not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts, 
citing the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants as an 
example.85   
The Court recognized that tribal members, each of whom is also a 
citizen of the United States, are subject to tribal tribunals, but stated that 
tribal sovereignty over members comes from the consent of its members, 
and declared that in the criminal context, membership marks the bounds of 
tribal authority.86  The voluntary character of tribal membership and the 
right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on 
consent, justified the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
members.87  
Without “endors[ing] . . . the theory of a jurisdictional void” that 
would arise if tribes lacked jurisdiction over minor crimes by nonmember 
Indians, the Court declared that this concern was not dispositive.88  The 
                                                                                                                          
79 Id. at 685–86.  As Professor Berger notes, this hackneyed vision of tribal communities lies at 
the heart of the opinion.  Berger, supra note 54, at 1062.  The Court ignored the modern realities of 
tribal communities in its vision of tribal governments acting only to preserve unique customs 
untouched by time, despite the fact that Duro’s own situation helped illustrate these.  Id.  Duro, 
although not a member of the tribe, lived with a tribal member on the reservation and was employed by 
the tribe, and his victim was also a resident of the reservation though he was a member of a separate, 
though historically related tribe.  Id. at 1062–63. 
80 Duro, 495 U.S. at 688, 693.  
81 Id. at 688. 
82 Id. at 693. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 694. 
88 Id. at 697. 
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Court offered several solutions for any void created by the decision.  It first 
noted that the MCA applies to major felonies such as the alleged murder in 
Duro, then suggested tribes could exercise their “traditional and undisputed 
power” to exclude persons whom they deem undesirable from their lands.89  
Further, the Duro Court stated that states may, with the consent of the 
tribes, assist in law enforcement on the reservation by assuming 
jurisdiction through Public Law 280.90  The Court also suggested that 
reciprocal agreements between tribes might operate to give separate tribal 
governments jurisdiction over each other’s members.91  Lastly, the Court 
stated that “if the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet 
the practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to 
address the problem is Congress, which has the ultimate authority over 
Indian affairs.”92  
1.  The Duro Fix 
The reaction in Indian country to the Supreme Court’s decision was 
immediate; within ten days, the National Congress of American Indians 
(“NCAI”) had convened a meeting of tribal, Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
congressional representatives to discuss the implications of the case and 
possible responses.93  The Deputy Director and Senior Counsel of the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs stated that “millions of people were 
calling all the time . . . . The outcry was clear and it was solid and 
everybody knew we had to fix it.”94  Congress responded to the Court’s 
invitation to overrule Duro; six months after the decision, Public Law 101-
511 was passed, amending the definition of tribal “powers of self-
government” in the ICRA to include “the inherent power of Indian tribes, 
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”95   
The initial legislation was effective only until September 30, 1991.96  
In the year that followed, Congress held “extensive hearings.”97  Congress 
determined that nonmember Indians own homes and property, are part of 
the labor force, are frequently married to tribal members, receive tribal 
services, and have other close ties to tribes, and therefore it was 
                                                                                                                          
89 Id. at 696.  
90 Id. at 697.  
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 698. 
93 Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 5, 11 
(2004).  
94 Id.  
95 Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)–(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
1301(2)(2000)).   
96 H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, Amendment No. 314 (1990) (Conf. Rep.). 
97 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 13 (1991).   
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appropriate to include them within the jurisdiction of tribal courts.98  
Congress also concluded that the historical record supported this 
jurisdiction, noting that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court ruled in the case of 
Duro, tribal governments had been exercising criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indian people within their reservation boundaries for well over two 
hundred years.”99  On October 28, 1991, Congress made the legislation 
permanent.100 
2.  Challenging the Duro Fix: United States v. Lara 
In United States v. Lara, the Supreme Court heard the first direct 
challenge to the Duro Fix: whether Congress had the constitutional power 
to relax restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on 
the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.101  Billy Jo Lara was an 
enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians in 
North Dakota.  He was married to a member of the Spirit Lake Tribe, also 
of North Dakota, and resided with his wife and children on the Spirit Lake 
Reservation.102  As a result of several incidents of serious misconduct, the 
Spirit Lake Tribe issued an order excluding Lara from the reservation.  
After violating the order, Lara was stopped by federal officers, and he 
struck one of the arresting officers.103  Lara was prosecuted by the Spirit 
Lake Tribe for violence to a policeman, plead guilty and served ninety 
days in prison.  The federal government then charged Lara with the federal 
crime of assaulting a federal police officer, the elements of which were 
similar to the tribal offense.104   
Lara brought a double jeopardy claim, arguing that the federal 
government’s prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment.105  The 
government argued that the dual sovereignty doctrine determined the 
outcome of Lara’s claim.  Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions brought by separate 
sovereigns.106  In the government’s view, the tribe was exercising its own 
inherent tribal authority in prosecuting Lara, as Congress recognized and 
affirmed in the Duro Fix.107  The Eight Circuit, reversing the district court, 
held that the tribal court, in prosecuting Lara, was exercising federal 
prosecutorial power delegated by Congress and therefore the dual 
sovereignty doctrine did not apply, and the Double Jeopardy Clause barred 
                                                                                                                          
98 Id. at 7.  
99 S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 2 (1991).  
100 Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646 (1991).  
101 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).  
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 196–97. 
105 Id. at 197. 
106 Id. (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)).  
107 Lara, 541 U.S. at 198 (2004).  
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the second prosecution.108   
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Congress can 
constitutionally authorize tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal 
authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.109  The Court found that 
Congress possessed the constitutional power to lift restrictions on the 
tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and cited several 
considerations that led it to this conclusion.110  The Court noted first that 
Congress has broad general powers to legislate with respect to Indian 
tribes, a power the Court has consistently referred to as “plenary and 
exclusive.”111  This plenary authority has been interpreted to allow 
Congress to both restrict and relax restrictions placed on tribal sovereign 
authority, which has historically caused major changes to the “metes and 
bounds of tribal sovereignty.”112   
The Lara Court also stated that it is within Congress’ power to modify 
the degree of autonomy enjoyed by a dependent sovereign that is not a 
state.113  Looking to prior precedent, the Court concluded that it had based 
previous interpretations of inherent tribal authority upon a variety of 
sources, one of which was Congressional legislation.  This source was 
subject to change and indeed had been changed in the wake of the Court’s 
ruling in Duro.114  The Court further noted that the change at issue in the 
case was a limited one and in large part concerns a tribe’s authority to 
control events that occur upon the tribe’s own land.115 
The Court explicitly declined to reach the merits of Lara’s due process 
and equal protection claims, finding that they were not properly presented 
in the context of his double jeopardy claim, and noting that other 
defendants in tribal proceedings remain free to raise such claims. 116  In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the case did not require the 
Court to address these difficult constitutional questions; however, he 
strongly suggested that the Court should resolve this issue in the future, 
calling it a “most troubling proposition.”117  According to Justice Kennedy, 
“the National Government seeks to subject a citizen to the criminal 
jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct occurring wholly within 
the territorial borders of the Nation and one of the States.  This is 
unprecedented.”118   
                                                                                                                          
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 210.  
110 Id. at 200.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 202.  
113 Id. at 203.  
114 Id. at 206–07.  
115 Id. at 204.  
116 Id. at 209.  
117 Id. at 212–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
118 Id. at 212.  
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Although the Supreme Court has not resolved this particular issue, it 
has given guidance on the application of the Equal Protection Clause to 
federal measures classifying Indian people.  Federal power to enact laws 
dealing specially with Indian tribes is explicitly provided by the Indian 
Commerce Clause and implicitly by the Treaty Clause.119  These measures, 
and federal practice since the founding of the United States, have led to an 
entire title of the U.S. Code composed of laws applicable only to Indian 
tribes and their members.120  Classifications of members of Indian tribes, 
moreover, do not turn primarily on race, but instead on their membership 
in uniquely sovereign entities.121  Therefore, the Supreme Court has held 
that federal measures classifying Indians will be upheld so long as they can 
be “tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward 
the Indians.”122  Although the Ninth Circuit has upheld the Duro Fix under 
this standard,123 more recent statements by the Court suggest that it may 
scrutinize an equal protection challenge to the Duro Fix more carefully.124 
Many commentators have discussed the possible outcomes of a 
challenge to the Duro Fix on both due process and equal protection 
grounds.125  The outcome of such a case is not within the scope of this 
                                                                                                                          
119 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
(Treaty Clause); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974).   
120 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.  
121 Id. at 553 n.24; see United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (stating that federal 
regulation of Indian affairs is not based on impermissible classifications; “[r]ather, such regulation is 
rooted in the unique status of Indians as ‘a separate people’ with their own political institutions.  
Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it 
is not to be viewed as legislation of a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’”) (citations omitted).   
122 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.  The Court stated that it had “on numerous occasions . . . upheld 
legislation that single[d] out Indians for particular and special treatment” and cited several examples.  
Id. at 554–55; see Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 
463, 500–01 (1979) (noting that “[i]t is settled” that the federal government may “enact legislation 
singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive”); Antelope, 
430 U.S. at 646–47 (applying this framework to uphold the application of federal criminal jurisdiction 
to Indian defendants).   
123 Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2005).   
124 See United States v. Lara 541 U.S. 193, 211–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing 
the “troubling proposition” reached by the majority and suggesting that the government may not 
subject a citizen to the criminal jurisdiction of a third entity beyond the limited extent that a member of 
a tribe consents to the jurisdiction of his own tribe); Id. at 231 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
Court should stand by its explanations in Oliphant and Duro and hold that Congress is without 
authority to enact the Duro Fix because “Congress cannot control the interpretation of the statute in a 
way that is at odds with the constitutional consequences of the tribes’ continuing dependent status”); 
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519–20 (2000) (stating that the Mancari opinion “was careful to note . 
. . that the case was confined to the authority of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs], an agency described as 
‘sui generis’”) (citations omitted); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243–45 n.1 
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s insistence on applying the label “strict 
scrutiny” to benign race-based programs will force the conclusion that “the special preferences that the 
National Government has provided to Native Americans since 1834 [are] comparable to the official 
discrimination against African-Americans that was prevalent for much of our history”). 
125 See, e.g., Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal Enforcement of 
Tribal Court Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 297, 318–19 (2004) (discussing possible constitutional 
limitations on the ability of Indian tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians after Lara); Anna 
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Note.  It seems likely, however, that the Court would use such a challenge 
to revisit the concerns about nonmember Indians and tribal courts that 
characterized Duro v. Reina.  Because these concerns relied on flawed 
analysis and incorrect assumptions, it is important to review and correct 
them now.   
III.  EXAMINING THE DURO COURT’S ASSUMPTIONS 
A.  Tribal Self-Government and Tribal Integrity 
The Duro Court recognized that tribes can extend jurisdiction where 
needed to preserve tribal integrity and self-determination, but implicitly 
held that exercising criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians did not 
fall within this category.126  The Court stated that for purposes of the 
criminal jurisdiction at issue in Duro, nonmember Indians were similarly 
situated to non-Indians.127  This reasoning is flawed and, in fact, the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is crucial to tribal 
integrity and self-determination.  Both the characteristics of most tribes 
today and reservation demographics belie the Court’s conclusions; 
reservations often have a significant number of nonmember Indians, with 
an average percentage of twelve percent.128   
In addition, Congress found that nonmember Indians are closely 
integrated into reservation affairs, substantially more so than are non-
Indians; nonmember Indians own homes and property on reservations, are 
part of the labor force on reservations, and frequently are married to tribal 
members.129  Nonmembers also receive the benefits of programs and 
services provided by the tribal government, such as health care services at 
tribal hospitals and clinics, and their children attend tribal schools.130  A 
high rate of marriage between member Indians and nonmembers is 
certainly a significant factor to be considered.  In a survey of 103 tribes 
                                                                                                                          
Sappington, Is Lara the Answer to Implicit Divestiture?  A Critical Analysis of the Congressional 
Delegation Exception, 7 WYO. L. REV. 149, 175–80 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
speculation that tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers may be subject to constitutional limits, 
and depending on how Congress structured its delegation, tribal jurisdiction could run afoul of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, 
and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47, 50–51, 61–70 (2004) (“[E]xplor[ing] the 
questions left unanswered by Lara: whether a tribal prosecution undertaken pursuant to the Duro Fix 
denies due process and equal protection to those nonmember Indians.”); Will Trachman, Comment, 
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 847, 851–52 (2005) (examining the proper standard of review as well as the merits of 
possible equal protection and due process claims). 
126 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (describing certain types of jurisdiction as “vital 
to the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination”).  
127 Id. 
128 S. REP. NO. 102-153, app. E at 58 (1991).  
129 Id. at 7.  
130 Id. 
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conducted by the NCAI in 1991, eighty percent of tribes reported that 
nonmember Indians were married to tribal members.131  Ninety-two 
percent reported that nonmember Indians worked on their reservations and 
twenty-five percent reported that nonmembers held interests in trust or 
restricted Indian land on their reservations.132   
It is inevitable that some portion of the nonmember Indian population 
residing on reservations will commit minor crimes.  Indeed, according to a 
report prepared by the United States Department of Justice, the rate of 
violent crime experienced by Indians was more than twice the national 
average between 1992 and 2001.133  Further, although the Duro Court 
characterized the jurisdiction as being over “relatively minor crimes,”134 by 
far the most common type of violent victimization among Indians was 
simple assault.135  Further, the assault rate among Indians was more than 
twice the rate experienced by other races.136  If a tribe could not exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, no sovereign would have 
the power to prosecute a significant portion of reservation populations 
which commit the most common violent crime occurring within 
reservation borders.  When compared to a 1999 Department of Justice 
Report, the rate of simple assault has increased, making tribal jurisdiction 
over these types of crimes even more necessary.137   
B.  Tribal Court Systems 
The Supreme Court stated in Duro that the special nature of tribal 
courts makes a focus on “consent” more appropriate.  Although the Court 
noted that modern tribal courts include “familiar features” of the judicial 
process, it stated that they are influenced by unique customs, languages, 
and usages of the tribes they serve.138  Further, the Court noted that often 
tribal courts are subordinate to other branches of government.139  Although 
the preservation of tradition and custom continues to be of utmost 
importance to any tribe, a report prepared by the American Indian Law 
Center found that tribal justice systems are predominantly Western-style, 
                                                                                                                          
131 S. REP. NO. 102-168, app. E at 58 (1991). 
132 Id. 
133 STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, at iv (2004).  
134 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990).  
135 PERRY, supra note 133, at 6.  
136 Id.  
137 LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 3 (1999) (noting that the rate of simple assault, 
the most common type of violent crime experienced by Indian victims, was fifty-six percent).  
138 Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.   
139 Id.  
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patterned after state and federal models.140  Of the tribes responding to the 
survey, seventy-eight percent had written codes defining their laws, with 
many of the codes incorporating federal, state or municipal laws.141  Nearly 
all of the tribal court systems have an appeals process.142  According to the 
survey, although seventy-five percent of the responding tribes have some 
laws based on Indian customs, such laws were primarily applied to tribal 
members.143 
As to the Court’s statement that tribal courts are often subordinate to 
other political branches, the American Indian Law Center survey 
contradicts this notion; in fact, the survey reports that very few tribal 
justice systems report political interference with the work of the courts.144     
C.  Tribal History Concerning Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
According to the Duro Court, historical evidence regarding criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is “less clear” than the record 
supporting jurisdiction over members.  However, the Court felt that “on 
balance” the historical record supports the view that inherent tribal 
jurisdiction extends only to tribe members.145  The historical evidence 
became more clear during the congressional hearings on the Duro Fix.  
Professor Richard Collins stated during the hearings that “in the period 
from the founding of the Republic until the latter part of the last century . . 
. [t]ribes exercised authority over members of other tribes who married into 
the tribe, were adopted into its families, or otherwise became part of the 
tribal community voluntarily.”146  Numerous tribal leaders stated during 
hearings in both the House and the Senate that tribes had historically 
exercised criminal jurisdiction over members of other tribes.147   
                                                                                                                          
140 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER, SURVEY OF TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND COURTS OF 
INDIAN OFFENSES 22 (2000) [hereinafter AILC Survey].  
141 Id. at 15, 18.  
142 Id. at 23. 
143 Id. at 15, 19.  
144 Id. at vii.  
145 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 691 (1990).  
146 The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearing on H.R. 
972 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 155 (1991) [hereinafter House 
Hearing] (statement of Professor Richard Collins).   
147 See Id. at 94 (statement of Michael T. Pablo, Chairman, Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes of the Flathead Nation) (stating that historically, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
have always exercised criminal jurisdiction over members of other tribes); id. at 102 (statement of Zane 
Jackson, Chairman, Warm Springs Tribal Council) (“[Since] the Warm Springs Reservation was first 
established . . . our people have exercised jurisdiction over Indians from other tribes who came to visit 
or live on our reservation . . . it was always the traditional law of our people that Indians from other 
tribes who came into our sovereign territory were subject to our laws.”); id. at 178 (statement of Donna 
M. Christensen, Attorney General, Navajo Nation) (“The Navajo people have interacted with other 
tribes from the beginning of our history.  Not surprisingly, the Navajo people, like other tribes, have 
always exercised what is known as criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians when necessary.”); 
see also Impact of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Duro v. Reina: Hearing on S. 962 and S. 963 Before 
the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Congress, pt. 2 at 36 (1991) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] 
 
 284 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:265 
Upon consideration of the evidence presented at the hearings, 
Congress concluded that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court ruled in the Duro case, 
tribal governments had been exercising criminal jurisdiction over all Indian 
people within their reservation boundaries for well over two hundred 
years.”148  Congress found that previous legislation with respect to Indian 
tribes indicated that it had not acted to divest tribal governments of their 
inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians; “[i]nstead, the assumption in Congress has always been that tribal 
governments do have such jurisdiction, and Federal statutes reflect this 
view.”149   
D.  ICRA and Defendants’ Rights 
Although the ICRA guarantees protections to criminal defendants in 
tribal court that are, for the most part, analogous to the protections 
guaranteed by the Constitution, the Duro Court stated that it was 
“significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribal 
governments.”150  The rights significant in the criminal context not 
expressly protected under the ICRA are the right to appointed counsel and 
to grand jury indictments.151  The right to appointed counsel for indigent 
defendants is certainly an important protection under the Bill of Rights and 
the Court understandably is hesitant to look past this difference between 
the Constitution and the ICRA.  The Court, however, does not discuss the 
fact that many tribes, although not required under the ICRA, do indeed 
provide a right to appointed counsel or defense advocate, or require the 
                                                                                                                          
(statement of Lawrence D. Wetsit, Chairman, Fort Peck Tribal Executive Board) (“The Fort Peck 
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes have historically always enjoyed jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on 
our reservation.”); id. at 62 (statement of Robert Lewis, Governor, Pueblo of Zuni) (“We have 
exercised jurisdiction over non-Zuni Indians for over 450 years within the legal framework of Spain, 
Mexico, and the United States in a fair and impartial way.”).   
148 S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 2 (1991); see H.R. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3 (1991) (Conf. Rep.) (stating 
that “tribal governments have always held” the right to exercise such jurisdiction as a matter of inherent 
authority).  
149 S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 3 (1991).  Congress also cited with approval Justice Brennan’s account 
of previous federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes, as contained in his dissenting opinion, 
which reached the conclusion that there was a “congressional presumption that tribes had power over 
all disputes between Indians regardless of tribal membership.”  Id. at 3–4.     
150 Duro, 495 U.S. at 693; see supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text (discussing key 
differences between the Bill of Rights and ICRA protections).   
151 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000) (enumerating specific protections).  As noted earlier, the ICRA 
also makes no mention of the impartiality of juries in the criminal context.  Id.  The Sixth Amendment 
expressly guarantees an impartial jury and has been interpreted to also guarantee a right to a fair cross 
section of the community.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).  
Although the ICRA does not specifically address these protections, it does include a broad guarantee 
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law or deprived of liberty or property without 
due process of law.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).   It also specifies that the jury must be comprised of at least 
six persons.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(10).  
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judge to safeguard the rights of a defendant with no legal representation.152  
Certain tribes are also required by their own constitutions or by tribal 
policy to provide appointed counsel to indigent defendants.153  Congress 
has also specifically authorized funding for legal assistance services to 
Indian tribes, which should increase the availability of appointed counsel 
in tribal courts.154   
The ICRA does not require that defendants be indicted by grand jury in 
criminal cases.  The Fifth Amendment requires an indictment by Grand 
Jury for “infamous crimes,” which have been interpreted to mean any 
offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of over one year.155  Since 
the ICRA does not authorize punishments involving more than one year of 
imprisonment, the right to a grand jury would not attach.156  Further, the 
Supreme Court has held that this right has not been incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and therefore need not be 
observed by the states.157  The ICRA further provides a right to habeas 
corpus review after the exhaustion of tribal court remedies.158  This serves 
as a significant safeguard for defendants alleging violations of basic 
fairness in tribal prosecutions.159   
A comprehensive empirical study of tribal court opinions involving 
individual rights claims suggests that concerns regarding tribal court 
treatment of rights under the ICRA are grossly overstated, if not entirely 
misplaced.160  Professor Rosen concludes that: 
[T]his Article’s findings counsel strongly against the 
proposals advanced by some commentators and members of 
Congress that federal court jurisdiction over ICRA be 
expanded, or tribal court jurisdiction curtailed, because tribal 
                                                                                                                          
152 See AILC Survey, supra note 140, at 27 (noting that many tribal court systems provide indigent 
defendants with defense attorneys or defense advocates, while others require that the judge assure the 
protection of defendants’ rights).  
153 House Hearing, supra note 146, at 177 (statement of Donna M. Christensen, Attorney General, 
Navajo Nation); see Senate Hearing, supra note 147, at 64 (statement of Burton Hutchinson, Chairman, 
Northern Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River Reservation of Wyoming) (“Public defender services are 
provided to any indigent person requesting through the Wind River Legal Services.”).   
154 25 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000).   
155 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (stating that an offense must be prosecuted by an indictment if 
punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 advisory 
committee’s note 1 (“[A]ny offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of over one year is an 
infamous crime.”).  
156 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (stating that tribal governments may not impose punishment greater 
than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5000, or both).  
157 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).   
158 25 U.S.C. § 1303.  
159 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-61, at 6 (1991) (stating that defendants in tribal court proceedings 
“[have] a remedy for violations of basic fairness which Congress imposed on tribes through a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal court”).  
160 Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of 
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 582 (2000). 
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courts have not responsibly interpreted ICRA . . . Tribal 
courts have found significant individual protections in ICRA 
even though they express the values of due process, equal 
protection, and so on, in ways that reflect and support tribal 
culture.  This finding casts doubt on the wisdom of curtailing 
the powers of the tribal courts.161 
In an extensive study of cases before the Navajo courts, Professor 
Berger similarly concludes that “[t]he data regarding the experience of 
nonmembers in Navajo courts do not support the assumption of the United 
States Supreme Court that nonmembers will be at a disadvantage in tribal 
courts.”162  In fact, nonmembers prevail slightly less than half of the time 
they appear before the Navajo courts, and the decisions reveal few 
troubling assessments of law or fact.163  Although the Court is properly 
concerned with safeguarding individual rights, empirical tribal court 
evidence suggests that a broad assumption that the ICRA inadequately 
protects defendants’ rights, or that tribal courts possess bias against 
nonmembers, is improper.   
E.  Membership and Consent 
The Duro Court asserts that Indians, like all other citizens, share 
allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the United States; a tribe’s 
additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and therefore 
in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.164  
The Court maintained that a nonmember like Duro was, for purposes of 
criminal jurisdiction, no different than a non-Indian.165  It emphasized the 
idea of consent, stating that Duro could not become a member of the 
prosecuting tribe, hold office, or serve on a jury.166  However, the Court’s 
assumption that nonmember Indians are similarly situated to non-Indians 
in reservation communities is inconsistent with modern realities.  The 
NCAI survey cited by Congress found that eighty percent of responding 
tribes reported marriages between members and nonmembers and over 
ninety percent reported that nonmember Indians worked on their 
reservations.167   
In an amicus brief filed by eighteen Indian tribes in the Lara case, the 
tribes stated that “[t]he story of Spirit Lake and Billy Jo Lara is typical 
throughout Indian Country.  Like Mr. Lara, Indians often choose to come 
                                                                                                                          
161 Id. at 582–83.   
162 Berger, supra note 54, at 1094.   
163 Id.  
164 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).   
165 Id. at 688.  
166 Id.  
167 S. REP. NO. 102-153, app. E, at 58 (1991).  
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to other tribes’ reservations and live in Indian communities.”168  The tribes 
noted that it is common for Indians to marry members of other tribes, live 
with parents who are members of other tribes, and be employed on 
reservations as nonmembers.  Indians who choose to move to other tribes’ 
reservations are entitled to receive services provided by those other tribes, 
and by the federal government, to all Indians regardless of tribal 
affiliation.169  Further, although nonmembers often cannot vote in tribal 
elections, many tribes allow nonmember Indians to have significant 
involvement in tribal affairs, including employment on tribal government 
boards and commissions, as tribal police officers, or as judges in tribal 
court.170   
Under the Duro Fix, an “Indian” is defined as any person who would 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the MCA if he 
were to commit one of the enumerated crimes in that section.171  Under this 
definition, a person is subject to federal criminal jurisdiction as an “Indian” 
only if he is (1) of Indian ancestry, and (2) is enrolled or affiliated with a 
federally recognized tribe.172  Therefore, nonmember Indians that come 
within the criminal jurisdiction of a tribe under the Duro Fix will be 
enrolled members of some tribe, with full rights of participation in that 
tribe.  Through this right, all enrolled members had an opportunity to 
express their view of the Duro Fix through their tribal governments at the 
time Congress was considering the amendments.  Congress did not find 
any Indian tribe opposed to this measure.173  The fact that the tribes were 
universally supportive of the Duro Fix, through their representative tribal 
governments and Congressional representatives, could therefore be seen as 
an approval from all tribal members.   
The Court emphasized that a tribe’s authority stems from the “consent” 
                                                                                                                          
168 Brief on Behalf of Eighteen American Indian Tribes as Amici Curiae at 8, United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107), 2003 WL 22766745.   
169 Id. 
170 See Senate Hearing, supra note 147, at 44 (statement of Dale Kohler, Chairman of Law and 
Justice, Colville Tribal Business Council) (stating that nonmember Indians serve on Colville tribal 
boards and commissions); id. at 47 (statement of Donald W. Johnson, Chairman, Makah Tribal 
Council) (stating that Makah tribal law permits nonmember Indians to serve as judges and jury 
members in tribal court); id. at 55 (statement of Harry Smiskin, Tribal Council Member, Yakima Indian 
Nation) (stating that the Yakima Nation employs nonmember Indians).  The Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians permits nonmembers to serve as judges in tribal court, and currently a 
nonmember, non-Indian is the Chief Judge of the Tribal Court.  Telephone Interview with Wilson D. 
Brott, Chief Judge, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians Tribal Court (Sept. 27, 
2007) (notes on file with Connecticut Law Review).  A report prepared for the Justice Department 
found that approximately ten percent of tribal law enforcement officers were nonmember Indians.  
STEWART WAKELING ET. AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN 
RESERVATIONS 25 (2001); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 147, at 46 (statement of Donald W. 
Johnson, Chairman, Makah Tribal Council) (“[A]bout [fifty] percent of [Makah tribal law enforcement] 
officers are nonmember Indians.”). 
171 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000).  
172 United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646–47 n.7 (1977).  
173 S. REP. NO. 102-168, app. E, at 59 (1991).  
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of its members and cites the fact that nonmembers may not vote in tribal 
government elections as evidence that consent has not been given.174  
However, there is no general requirement that sovereigns extend the voting 
franchise to all persons whom they subject to criminal jurisdiction.175  Non-
citizens of the United States have no entitlement to political participation 
but are nevertheless subject to federal criminal jurisdiction.  Perhaps more 
analogous is the fact that a resident of one state who commits a crime in 
another state is certainly subject to that state’s criminal jurisdiction, despite 
his inability to participate in the political process in that state.  To require 
that all persons have voting rights in order for the government to maintain 
criminal jurisdiction is inconsistent with federal and state policies and is 
impractical on reservations where a nonmember has significant community 
ties but may lack the ability to vote based on his membership.   
F.  Suggested Remedies 
The Duro Court answered the argument that they were creating a 
jurisdictional void by suggesting several different remedies that would be 
available to tribes and the federal and state governments in the wake of 
their decision.176  None of these are viable alternatives to tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.   The Duro Court’s suggested 
remedies are simply unworkable and not realistic.177  One suggestion 
proposed by the Court was that states’ jurisdiction under Public Law 280 
could be expanded, a remedy one commentator referred to as the Court’s 
“most astonishing and offensive suggestion.”178  The reality is that in fact 
few Indians have been subject to Public Law 280 and it has been unpopular 
with both the tribes and states to which it applied.179  Since Congress 
neither appropriated funds for state law enforcement in Indian country nor 
made Indian lands taxable by the states, the state governments resented the 
fact that they were given the duty of law enforcement but no means to pay 
for it.180  Tribes also resented the fact that state jurisdiction was thrust upon 
them without their consent, a further erosion of their sovereignty.181   
                                                                                                                          
174 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990).  
175 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69–74 (1978) (holding that extension 
of a city’s criminal jurisdiction to residents of adjoining areas who did not have voting rights did not 
violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses). 
176 Duro, 495 U.S. at 696–98.  
177 See Wildenthal, supra note 30, at 129 (“Kennedy offered several weak proposals that simply 
underscored his ignorance of Indian law and Indian country.”).  
178 Id.  
179 WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 233 (4th ed. 2004); 
Wildenthal, supra note 30, at 129 (“The vast majority of Indians have never been subject to Public Law 
280, which has been intensely unpopular with both states and tribes.”). 
180 CANBY, JR., supra note 179, at 233; Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 
Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 699, 704 (2006).  
181 CANBY, JR., supra note 179, at 233. 
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The result of these criticisms were amendments to the law requiring 
tribal consent before any state could assume jurisdiction; since these 
amendments were passed in 1968 there has been almost no expansion of 
Public Law 280.182  To suggest that Public Law 280 jurisdiction should 
now be expanded to close the jurisdictional gap created by the Duro 
decision makes little sense, considering that the law’s shortcomings have 
led to lawlessness in many parts of Indian country.183  Evidence received 
by Congress when it was considering the Duro Fix supports this 
conclusion.  Tribal governments reported to Congress that even in those 
states with jurisdiction under Public Law 280, state law enforcement 
officers refused to exercise jurisdiction over criminal misdemeanors 
committed by Indians against Indians on reservation lands.184  In fact, 
several states with large Indian populations enacted measures calling on 
Congress to make the initial Duro Fix legislation permanent.185 
The Court also noted that federal statutes could be construed to grant 
the federal government jurisdiction over misdemeanor crimes between 
Indians.186  Even if the statute were formally amended to expand federal 
jurisdiction, a further intrusion of tribal sovereignty contrary to 
longstanding federal policy, evidence suggests that this would prove 
unworkable.  As Congress recognized, the “[c]rowded dockets of U.S. 
District Courts do not lend themselves to being ‘traffic court’ for this 
category of Indian reservation cases.”187  The vast areas encompassed by 
some reservations would make it difficult and expensive to transport 
defendants, victims, witnesses and law enforcement officers to handle the 
arraignments, trials and sentences required in the prosecution of such 
crimes.188  According to the Senate Report, in the wake of the Duro 
decision, tribal governments called upon federal and state law enforcement 
authorities to assist them in assuring that offenders of federal law would be 
prosecuted.189  However, reports soon came to Congress that United States 
Attorneys, “overburdened with the prosecution of major crimes, could not 
                                                                                                                          
182 Id. 
183 See Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 180, at 729 (“[S]tate and county police in Public Law 
280 jurisdictions either provide less satisfactory service than those in non-Public Law 280 jurisdictions, 
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than in non-Public Law 280 jurisdictions.”); see also Wildenthal, supra note 30, at 129 (“The 
inadequacies of Public Law 280 have led to endemic lawlessness in many parts of Indian country.”). 
184 S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 4 (1991).   
185 Id.  Arizona, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, and South Dakota “enacted measures calling 
upon the Congress to permanently reaffirm tribal government jurisdiction over non-member Indians 
who commit misdemeanor crimes.”  Id.  New Mexico was unable to pass a final bill before 
adjournment but a measure did pass the house unanimously and was reported on favorably by the state 
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resolution.  Id. app. B at 47.   
186 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990).  
187 H.R. REP. NO. 102-61, at 3 (1991).  
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189 S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 4 (1991).  
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assume the caseload of criminal misdemeanors referred from tribal courts 
for prosecution of nonmember Indians.”190  Even as to major crimes, for 
which the federal government has long had jurisdiction, the declination 
rate remains unsatisfactory to a majority of tribes.191  According to 
Congress, less than forty-three percent of all referrals were prosecuted in 
1988 and less than forty percent of all referrals were prosecuted in 1989.192   
More recent data confirms this finding.  A 2007 study published by 
The Denver Post determined that the overall declination rate by the federal 
government for reservation cases is just over sixty-two percent.193  A six 
month investigation of twenty reservations by the newspaper revealed 
startling instances where serious reservation crimes go unpunished, putting 
residents at risk.194  The report found that United States Attorneys and FBI 
investigators face huge challenges fighting crime on reservations; they are 
often viewed as outsiders and the remote locations and high levels of 
alcohol use by witnesses make prosecutions difficult.195  The high 
declination rate is in part due to the fact that (1) federal prosecutors want to 
prosecute more high profile cases, such as major drug or white collar crime 
cases, and (2) federal prosecutors want to bring cases with a high 
likelihood of success.196  In other instances it is not simply a lack of will 
that is the problem, but a question of numbers.  On the Blackfeet 
Reservation, for example, there are only three federal agents assigned to 
investigate felony crimes, with each juggling up to fifty cases.197  One 
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191 S. REP. NO. 102-168, app. E, at 60 (1991) (reporting that sixty-three percent of responding 
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196 Id.  One tribal prosecutor wryly stated that Indian country was the FBI’s “third-highest 
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United States Attorney noted that the lack of investigation of low-priority 
felonies erodes faith in justice on reservations just as much as would 
ignoring murders.198  In light of the current problems with felony 
investigations and prosecutions, the Court’s suggestion that federal 
jurisdiction be expanded is a dangerous idea and should not be considered 
a viable option. 
Another measure suggested by the Court is to banish undesirable 
persons from reservation lands.199  As one commentator has noted, “such a 
solution is both repugnant and unworkable.”200  With the high rate of 
intermarriage between tribal members and nonmembers, the exclusion of 
nonmembers from the reservation—thus, perhaps dividing families—
would be more of an intrusion upon essential liberties than criminal 
prosecution.201  Further, as the Lara case illustrates, the exclusion power is 
not a practical way to preserve order among those who live on the 
reservation; the incident which brought Lara before the court arose out of 
attempts to enforce an exclusion order against him.202  In the NCAI survey 
relied on by Congress, eighty-nine percent of responding tribes stated that 
excluding nonmember Indians was not a workable solution.203  The most 
frequently cited reasons were extensive intermarriage between members 
and nonmembers, the large presence of nonmember children and 
nonmember employment on the reservation.204   
The Duro opinion also suggests that tribal governments could form 
reciprocal agreements to grant jurisdiction over one another’s members.205  
However, the Court does not address the fact that there would be a 
tremendous amount of practical difficulties involved with attempting to 
make enforceable agreements between over five hundred federally 
recognized tribes.   
After suggesting these various remedies in a portion of the opinion that 
seems like more of an afterthought by the Court, it stated that “[i]f the 
present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical 
needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the 
problem is Congress, which has ultimate authority over Indian affairs.”206  
Of course, Congress did just that when it enacted the Duro Fix within six 
months of the Court’s decision, but the significance of the anecdotal 
evidence received by Congress in the intervening period should not be 
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overlooked.  The jurisdictional void stressed by the tribes and predicted by 
the Ninth Circuit became a reality.  As the House Report stated, “[t]he 
Committee was inundated with anecdotal accounts describing serious 
jurisdictional law and order problems resulting from the Court's holding.  
Nonmember Indian perpetrators on reservations could no longer be taken 
to the most accessible forums.  Remote reservations with high rates of 
intermarriage with other tribes were facing chaos.”207  Congress received a 
large amount of testimony from tribes across the country facing serious 
problems as a result of the Court’s decision.208  For example, the Yakima 
Indian Nation reported that it was forced to dismiss pending charges 
against forty-three Indians because they were not formally enrolled 
members of the tribe.209  The Suquamish Indian Tribe testified that six 
cases had to be dismissed after the Court’s decision in Duro, and that it 
was unable to prosecute at least twelve other incidents.210  The U.S. 
Attorney for the District of South Dakota and Chair of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Indian Affairs Subcommittee testified that the Duro decision created a 
sudden deprivation of long and widely-exercised jurisdiction causing a 
serious law enforcement problem in Indian country.211  He stated that the 
“the jurisdictional gap is real and adversely affects the tribe’s ability to 
protect reservation residents from violations of the law.”212   
The Duro Court’s conclusions, and the assumptions it relied on in 
reaching its conclusions, must be reexamined if the Court is faced with a 
due process or equal protection challenge to the Duro Fix.  Practical 
realities involving law enforcement problems faced by many tribes in the 
wake of the Court’s decision should not be ignored, nor should the 
demographic realities of modern tribal communities.  Nonmember Indians 
make up a significant portion of many reservations and are often integrated 
into the community through family and employment, making the Court’s 
focus of “consent” and voting rights appear misplaced.  The alternatives 
suggested by the Court are, quite simply, unrealistic and unworkable.  
Evidence presented to Congress following the Court’s decision clearly 
illustrates this.  Criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is crucial to 
the maintenance of tribal self-government and the regulation of tribal 
integrity, and must be recognized as such.   
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IV.  AN EXAMINATION OF TWO TRIBES 
Nearly twenty years after the Court’s decision in Duro, changing 
conditions and demographics in Indian country further illustrate the 
inaccuracy of many of the Court’s assumptions.  In order to analyze 
critically the applicability of the Court’s reasoning to today’s tribal 
communities, it is necessary to examine conditions “on the ground” in 
Indian country today.  The significant number of Indian tribes in both 
Michigan and Washington make a study of the Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation particularly insightful when examining nonmember criminal 
jurisdiction.   
A.  Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
A historical question often asked of ethnologists who study Indian 
cultures is “[w]hich tribe lived in this area when white people first 
arrived?”213  This question, however, is more properly a question of non-
Indian history, as the very concept of “tribe” as it is used today had little 
meaning to native peoples before they had extensive contact with non-
Indian settlers.214  In Michigan, where the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa 
and Chippewa Indians is located, the native people living there prior to 
contact with European settlers would have identified themselves 
collectively as “Anishnabeg,” meaning “original man.”215  Beyond this, a 
native of this area would most likely have identified with a clan on the 
basis of his father’s lineage, then with a particular band, a small local 
economic and sociopolitical group.216   
The Ottawa and Chippewa bands migrated from the Atlantic seaboard 
and in the sixteenth century formed the loosely-organized Three Fires 
Confederacy along with the Potawatomi.217  They referred to themselves 
collectively as the Anishnabeg, spoke similar dialects of the Algonquin 
language, and shared many cultural beliefs and practices, including a clan 
system.218  In 1836, the Treaty of Washington brought the largest cession 
of land to the federal government by Michigan Indians and led to statehood 
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for Michigan.219  The treaty also created the artificial Ottawa and 
Chippewa Tribe, since the two bands had agreed to act in concert for treaty 
purposes.220  Currently, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians is located across a six county service area in northwest Michigan221 
and has a membership total of approximately 4000 individuals.222   
The Grand Traverse Band’s court system stems from Article V of its 
Constitution, which vests the judicial power in a tribal court system 
composed of a court of general jurisdiction and an appellate court.223  The 
Constitution also contains a Judicial Independence clause, providing that 
“[t]he Tribal Judiciary shall be independent from the legislative and 
executive functions of the tribal government and no person exercising 
powers of the legislative or executive functions of government shall 
exercise powers properly belonging to the judicial branch of 
government.”224  This is inapposite to the Court’s assumption in Duro that 
tribal courts are often subordinate to other political branches,225 and 
consistent with the American Indian Law Center Survey which found little 
interference with the court systems by other branches of tribal 
governments.226   
The Grand Traverse Band has an extensive criminal code of laws,227 
which is inconsistent with the Court’s assumption in Duro that tribes often 
depend on “unspoken practices and norms.”228  Criminal jurisdiction is 
codified to extend to members of the Grand Traverse Band and all other 
Indians present within the territory of the Band.229  “Indian” is defined in 
the code to include a member of the Band, a member of any federally-
recognized Indian tribe, band, or group, or a person of Indian blood who is 
generally considered to be American Indian by the Grand Traverse Band 
community.230  This is inconsistent with the Court’s presumption in Duro 
that a nonmember Indian is similarly situated to a non-Indian for purposes 
of criminal jurisdiction.231  Here, tribal jurisdiction will extend only to 
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those who are enrolled in a federally-recognized tribe, or have integrated 
themselves in the Band’s community such that he or she is recognized as 
an Indian by the community.   
Although specific statistics regarding the number of nonmembers 
living within the Band’s territory are not kept by the tribe, the General 
Counsel of the tribe, John Petoskey, estimated that there are a significant 
number.232  Mr. Petoskey stated that there are nonmembers who reside in 
public housing on the central reservation and that many are married to 
members.233  Specifically, there has traditionally been a high rate of 
intermarriage between members of the Ottawa and the Saginaw Chippewa 
Indian Tribes, due in large part to the federal allotment policy.  During the 
federal government’s policy of allotment, as land in traditional “Ottawa 
country” became largely occupied, the federal government allowed 
members to take trust allotments in traditional “Saginaw country,” which is 
located southeast of the Band’s current six county area.234  As a result, 
many members of the Grand Traverse Band have ancestral ties to both 
tribes, and may be eligible for enrollment in either tribe.235  Mr. Petoskey 
estimated that as many as a dozen individuals who grew up enrolled in the 
Grand Traverse Band, have dis-enrolled and enrolled in the Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe.  This could be due in part to the higher per capita 
distribution from casino revenues individuals receive as members of the 
Saginaw Chippewa Indian tribe.  However, these individuals remain living 
on Grand Traverse Band land, as they always have, and are deeply 
involved in the community.236  Nonmembers are eligible for tribal 
employment and can serve on tribal committees; although they cannot 
vote, they can and do attend tribal council meetings and have an 
opportunity to speak at those meetings.237   
Wilson D. Brott, Chief Judge of the Grand Traverse Band Tribal 
Court, estimates that roughly ten percent or less of the criminal cases 
before the court involve nonmember Indians.238  Many of these cases 
involve members of the Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians or 
members of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe.  Chief Judge Brott noted 
that there are many inter-tribal relationships and cautioned against the idea 
that there are “walls” between different Michigan tribes.239  This is 
consistent with the historical development of Michigan’s tribes, who, as 
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discussed above, traditionally did not primarily identify themselves as 
members of specific tribes but as Anishnabeg.240  Chief Judge Brott also 
noted that many of the nonmember Indians appearing before the court are 
married to Grand Traverse Band members, and it is not uncommon for a 
family to have members of the Grand Traverse Band as well as members 
of other tribes.241  Although nonmembers cannot vote in tribal elections, 
Chief Judge Brott pointed out that there are many ways that an individual 
can be involved in the community outside of the voting franchise.  Like 
Mr. Petoskey, Chief Judge Brott noted that nonmembers can be employed 
by the tribe and although they cannot vote for the tribal council, they 
regularly attend meetings and have a voice that would be heard.242  
Nonmembers also get the benefits of tribal services, including health care, 
and often are raising children who attend tribal schools and are eligible for 
enrollment, if not formally enrolled.  Chief Judge Brott acknowledged that 
in some instances there are cases of nonmember Indians who come to the 
reservation temporarily and do not have extensive ties to the community, 
but this is a rarer occurrence.243  
A cross-deputization agreement between the Grand Traverse Band and 
the state and county sheriff’s department was reached in 1990 and is an 
important law enforcement tool for the tribe.244  The agreement removes 
the jurisdictional question for purposes of arrest; an offender can be 
arrested by the state, county, or tribe and is brought to the county jail 
where he or she will be referred to the proper prosecutorial body once his 
or her status is determined.245   
Although nonmember Indians cannot serve on Grand Traverse Band 
tribal court juries, Chief Judge Brott estimated that out of approximately 
300–400 criminal cases before the court, which includes traffic cases, there 
have been only one or two jury trials in the previous four years.246  Plea 
agreements are reached in some cases and for those that go to trial, the vast 
majority are conducted as bench trials.  Although all criminal defendants 
have a right to a jury trial, this right is often waived prior to the 
commencement of trial.247  The tribe does not provide counsel to indigent 
defendants, although Chief Judge Brott stated that in cases involving a pro 
se defendant, judges will assist defendants if necessary.  This assistance 
could involve further explanation before and during trial to assure that the 
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defendant knows his rights and understands the legal process.  During 
bench trials, judges can give the appropriate weight to hearsay evidence, or 
other evidence that may have been admitted without an objection from a 
pro se defendant, for example.248  Chief Judge Brott, who also has served 
as a prosecutor for the local state court in Leelanau County, stated that 
there are no major differences between the manner in which the tribal court 
conducts trials and the way they are conducted in the state court.249  
Importantly, even if a certain tribal court operated with different procedure, 
the major protections are the same.  All tribal courts are required to follow 
the ICRA and all adhere to basic principles of justice such as having a fair 
trial and an ability to be heard.250   
Although the Grand Traverse Band does not publish its tribal court 
cases and therefore no specific opinions could be researched, Mr. 
Petoskey, who has been the Band’s General Counsel for some twenty 
years, recalled two cases in the intervening period between the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Duro and the Duro Fix.251  The court chose to exercise 
jurisdiction over the defendant, and in neither case was the issue 
challenged by the defendant.  Mr. Petoskey believed that this was most 
likely due to the fact that the nonmember defendants involved had been a 
part of the tribal community and would not object to the court’s 
jurisdiction.252  One of these instances involved a nonmember living in the 
Grand Traverse community and married to a member of the Band; he was 
arrested and prosecuted for an assault that arose out of a fight at a card 
game.253  This type of scenario exemplifies the need for tribal court 
jurisdiction over nonmembers for the preservation of law and order and 
tribal self-government.  What could be seen as a relatively minor crime 
still must be prosecuted in order to maintain a safe community.  According 
to Chief Judge Brott, based on his previous experience as a defense 
attorney, most nonmember Indians would prefer to be prosecuted in tribal 
court rather than state court.254  As previously stated, many are integrated 
into the tribal community and therefore the jury is truly composed of their 
“peers” despite the fact that nonmembers cannot serve on juries.255   
If the Duro Fix were to be struck down, Mr. Petoskey believed the 
effect would be more drastic than it was in 1990 due to the fact that there is 
a larger population of nonmember Indians residing in Grand Traverse Band 
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country.256  Both Mr. Petoskey and Chief Judge Brott stated that if this 
occurred, the tribe would be forced to increase its reliance on federal 
prosecution.257  In many previous instances, however, the federal 
government has been unable to prosecute crimes occurring on the 
reservation for a variety of reasons.258  The federal court is also over two 
hundred miles away, and therefore for practical reasons it would most 
likely be difficult for the federal government to prosecute a large number 
of misdemeanor crimes occurring on the reservation.259  Exclusion orders 
are not a viable option in Chief Judge Brott’s view; although the tribe has 
that option, it is very reluctant to exercise it since most often the individual 
would be integrated with the tribe through marriage and may have children 
living on the reservation and attending tribal schools.  Further, as a 
practical matter, exclusion orders are very difficult to enforce.260   
B.  Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation  
The Colville Reservation was established by Executive Order in 1872 
and originally spanned over 2.8 million acres.261  Today the reservation 
land base covers 1.4 million acres located in North Central Washington 
and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation has membership 
totaling over nine thousand.262  Today’s members are the descendants of 
twelve aboriginal tribes of Indians who resided throughout the Northwest 
and were largely nomadic, traveling with the seasons and their sources of 
food.263  The Confederated Tribes are a northerly component of an 
“Interior Salish” grouping that shared a common language called 
“Okanagan,” although there were several different dialects.264  The Colville 
and other tribes intermarried with adjacent peoples, but this differed among 
the various divisions.265  For current Confederated Tribes members this 
means that they could have ancestral ties to several Northwest tribes, both 
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within and outside of the twelve tribes comprising the Confederated 
Tribes.  This further illustrates the idea that tribal membership is not as 
static as the Court implied in Duro, and in fact involves intertribal 
relationships spanning many generations. 
The Confederated Tribes’ court system stems from its Constitution, 
which establishes a judicial branch, separate from the other branches of 
government, consisting of a tribal court and a court of appeals.266  
Although the Confederated Tribes’ Constitution does not contain a 
“judicial independence” clause similar to that found in the Grand Traverse 
Constitution, the judiciary is not subordinate to the Business Council, the 
governing body of the Tribes, but a separate branch of government.267 
The Confederated Tribes have a comprehensive Law and Order Code, 
with titles ranging from Rules of Procedure to Natural Resources and the 
Environment.268  The criminal jurisdiction of the Tribes is codified and 
includes all crimes committed by any Indian within the boundaries of the 
Colville Reservation.269  “Indian” is defined as “a person who is recognized 
by an Indian Tribe as a member of that Tribe or is a descendant of such 
member.”270  The structure of the tribal court system, as well as the 
comprehensive code provisions, are inconsistent with the Duro Court’s 
assumptions that tribal courts are subordinate to other branches of 
government and have laws that depend on unspoken practices and norms 
rather than written codes.271   
In Stead v. Colville Confederated Tribes, the Colville Court of Appeals 
was presented with unique issues concerning tribal court criminal 
jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian following Duro.272  Michael Stead 
was a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe but had resided on the Colville 
Reservation for ten years prior to his arrest for the misdemeanor offense of 
driving without a valid driver’s license.273  Stead was cited by tribal police 
on August 2, 1991, and arraigned on August 12, at which point he was 
assigned a public defender.  In a pre-trial motion filed on the day of the 
trial, Stead moved the court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  Stead 
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over him as a nonmember, based 
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Duro and the recent expiration of Public 
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Law 101-511, the initial Duro Fix.274  His motion was denied and he was 
brought to trial, convicted, and sentenced to a sixty day suspended 
sentence and three hundred dollar fine.  On appeal, Stead argued 
essentially that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial in light 
of his status as a nonmember Indian.275   
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court, holding that the Duro Fix 
was a recognition of the inherent jurisdiction of tribal courts over 
nonmember Indians that has always existed and continued uninterrupted 
despite the Duro decision.276  The Appellate Court cited approvingly 
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, stating that the notion of tribal 
authority to control the conduct of tribal members based on consent is 
inconsistent with federal and state policies.277  The Appellate Court further 
concluded that the jurisdictional void created by the Court’s decision in 
Duro renders its reasoning suspect, and that the Duro Fix was enacted in 
response to an emergency situation in Indian country as a result of the 
Duro decision.278  The Appellate Court also noted the significance of 
Congress’ recognition of the past federal practice of settling more than one 
tribe on a single reservation, and the fact that although nonmember Indians 
are not allowed to fully participate in all aspects of the tribal government, 
they are provided with a broad array of services by the tribe.279   
The Stead decision illustrates that the Duro Court’s assumption that 
non-Indians and nonmember Indians are similarly situated is simply 
erroneous.  Stead’s situation is similar to the defendants in both Duro and 
Lara, as well as Congressional findings during hearings on the Duro Fix: 
Stead had resided on the reservation for a decade and was an enrolled 
member of a federally recognized tribe.280  The notion that his rights as a 
citizen were being violated by the prosecution is misplaced; the tribe was 
exercising jurisdiction to maintain the safety of its residents on its 
roadways by prosecuting a member of a federally recognized tribe who 
chose to reside on the Colville Reservation for ten years.  Stead was 
granted his rights under the ICRA and was also appointed with a tribal 
public defender, further calling into question the Duro Court’s broad 
assumptions regarding procedural protections in Indian country.281  This 
type of offense also highlights the need for tribal jurisdiction, since 
although driving without a license is a misdemeanor and can easily be 
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characterized as a minor crime, it is crucial to the maintenance of the 
health and safety of reservation residents that the roadways be policed 
effectively.   
Another case arising on the Colville Reservation, cited in the six-
month Denver Post investigation, underscores the likely inadequacy of 
federal jurisdiction if the Duro Fix were struck down.282  In that case, the 
federal government declined to prosecute a tribal member who raped his 
girlfriend’s seven-year-old sister.283  Although the tribe’s prosecutor stated 
that an expert forensic interviewer found the seven-year-old’s testimony 
clear and credible, the Assistant United States Attorney, faced with a 
geographically distant case and a seven-year-old witness, simply declined 
to prosecute.284  The tribe’s prosecutor successfully obtained a conviction 
in tribal court under misdemeanor charges;285 however, if the federal 
government cannot effectively exercise its current jurisdiction under the 
MCA, it is dangerous to assume that expanding that jurisdiction to cover 
misdemeanor offenses is a viable remedy were the Supreme Court to strike 
down the Duro Fix.   
Anita Dupris, Chief Justice of the Colville Confederated Tribes Court 
of Appeals since 1995, estimates that approximately half of the 
reservation’s ten thousand residents are either nonmember Indians or non-
Indians.286  Although the tribe does not keep specific statistics as to how 
many nonmember Indians reside on the reservation, if consistent with the 
average cited by Congress, the reservation could be home to upwards of 
one thousand nonmember Indians, a significant number.287  Many 
nonmembers living on the Colville Reservation are there through 
intermarriage, and under the tradition and custom of the tribe, when an 
individual from another tribe marries a tribal member, he or she becomes a 
part of the tribe’s community and is treated as such.288  Chief Justice 
Dupris believes that exercising criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians is crucial to tribal self-government and tribal integrity.289  This 
jurisdiction leads back to the basic idea of sovereignty and is a 
foundational building block of any society.  A society must be able to 
monitor the laws and these laws must be enforceable in order to be a 
sovereign government; the Court’s decision in Duro further eroded tribal 
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sovereignty and was inconsistent with basic notions of Indian law.290   
According to Chief Justice Dupris, the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that tribes had not traditionally exercised criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers is “patently false.”291  The Confederated Tribes have always 
exercised this type of jurisdiction, as was reflected in the Appellate Court’s 
decision in Stead.292  Although prior to the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 many tribes may not have had western-style courts, this jurisdiction 
in some form has always been an aspect of tribal sovereignty.293  As to the 
use of unspoken practices and norms referred to in Duro, the Confederated 
Tribes’ traditions and customs have been codified into its extensive 
criminal code.  In this sense, it can be compared to a state’s incorporation 
of its common law into its criminal code.294   
As referenced in Stead, the Confederated Tribes has maintained a 
public defender’s office since 1993.295  This is common throughout all 
tribes in Washington; although in some instances a lay advocate or public 
defender can be appointed, generally defendants in tribal courts will have 
assistance of counsel.296  Chief Justice Dupris does not believe that any of 
the Duro Court’s suggested remedies are viable alternatives if the Duro Fix 
were struck down.297  Although the Colville Tribal Courts have good 
working relationships with the state, the state would have tremendous 
practical difficulties taking over the ten thousand cases heard annually by 
tribal courts.298  Federal jurisdiction is hardly more desirable.  As 
previously discussed, even in situations where the federal government has 
jurisdiction under the MCA, such jurisdiction is not often exercised.299  
According to figures published in the Denver Post study, the overall 
federal declination rate in Washington was over fifty-five percent for 
felony crimes between 2004 and the first nine months of 2007.300  Chief 
Justice Dupris believed that many of these cases were declined either 
because federal prosecutors want only “sure-bets,” or the cases were not 
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given a high enough priority.301  As to the Duro Court’s suggestion of 
exclusion, even if this were a desirable alternative for the tribe in a certain 
situation, these orders are very difficult to enforce.302   
V.  CONCLUSION 
If faced with a challenge to the Duro Fix on either equal protection or 
due process grounds, the Supreme Court should reexamine its decision in 
Duro in light of nearly twenty years of anecdotal evidence, case law and 
congressional findings illustrating that its assumptions were incorrect and 
its reasoning flawed.  The problems faced by tribes in the wake of the 
Court’s decision in Duro, as well as the continuing law enforcement 
problems tribes face on today’s reservations cannot be ignored.  It has been 
demonstrated that the Court’s historical findings were inaccurate, and that 
tribes exercised criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers for over two 
hundred years.  With high rates of intermarriage and historically complex 
interrelationships between tribes, membership in a particular tribe is not as 
static as the Court suggests in Duro.  As demonstrated by the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, many of today’s 
reservation residents have ancestral and historical ties to more than one 
tribe.  Therefore, it is commonplace that those residing on a reservation 
may not be members of the presiding tribe.  Tribes’ ability to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is crucial to the maintenance of 
self-government and tribal integrity, as nonmembers residing on 
reservations are most often integrated into the reservation community.  
Tribal governments must be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers committing crimes that would otherwise go unprosecuted if 
left to federal or state authorities.  Although misdemeanor crimes do not 
often garner headlines, reducing these types of crimes is crucial for the 
maintenance of a safe community and therefore integral for effective tribal 
self-government.   
The remedies suggested by the Duro Court were either unrealistic or 
unworkable and cannot be reasonably relied on as alternatives to the Duro 
Fix.  Modern tribal characteristics and demographics, combined with the 
continuing law enforcement challenges faced by tribes today, make 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians an important aspect of tribal 
sovereignty that must be unambiguously recognized by the Supreme Court. 
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